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 INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM WITH
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GAST ON LLANESy AND RAMIRO DE ELEJALDEx
Abstract. We present a model of industry equilibrium to study
the coexistence of Open Source (OS) and Proprietary (P) rms.
Two novel aspects of the model are: (1) participation in OS arises
as the optimal decision of prot-maximizing rms, and (2) OS and
P rms may (or may not) coexist in equilibrium. Firms decide
their type and investment in R&D, and sell packages composed
of a primary good (like software) and a complementary private
good. The only dierence between both kinds of rms is that
OS share their technological advances on the primary good, while
P keep their innovations private. The main contribution of the
paper is to determine conditions under which OS and P coexist in
equilibrium. Interestingly, this equilibrium is characterized by an
asymmetric market structure, with a few large P rms and many
small OS rms.
Keywords: Industry Equilibrium, Open Source, Innovation, Com-
plementarity, Technology Sharing, Cooperation in R&D (JEL O31,
L17, D43).
1. Introduction
Collaboration in research enhances the chances of discovery and cre-
ation. This is true not only for scientic discoveries, but also for com-
mercial innovations. However, innovators face incentives to limit the
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access of competitors to their innovations. According to the traditional
view in the economics of innovation, innovators innovate because they
obtain a monopolistic advantage over their competitors. Therefore, in-
novators should prevent others from gaining access to their discoveries,
either by keeping them secret or by protecting them with patents.
This view contrasts with the Open Source (OS) development model,
which has been intensively used in the software industry and in other
industries at various points in time, as documented in the next section.
In OS, developers voluntarily choose to disclose their technological im-
provements so that they can be copied, used and improved by other
innovators free of charge. But if everybody has access to the same
technologies, then how do developers benet from their collaborations?
What do they receive in exchange for renouncing their monopolistic ad-
vantage? The answer is that OS producers prot by selling goods and
services which are complementary to the OS good.
The case of the Linux operating system is a good example. Linux
receives substantial contributions of commercial rms like IBM, HP
and Red Hat, among others, which benet from selling complementary
goods and services. For example, IBM sells consulting services and
complementary proprietary software, HP sells personal computers and
computer servers, and Red Hat sells training and support services.
Still, this leaves open the questions of why OS and Proprietary (P)
rms coexist in the same markets, and what are the implications of
such coexistence on market structure and investments in R&D. Existing
literature has yet to address these questions, which are instead the main
focus of this paper.
The importance of the topic is best seen by looking at the software
industry, where OS and P rms coexist in almost all market segments.
In the market of relational database management systems (databases),
for example, OS products like MySQL, Apache Derby and PostgreSQL
compete against P alternatives like Oracle 11g, IBM DB2 and Microsoft
SQL Server (see Table 1 in next section for more examples).
We present a model of industry equilibrium with endogenous tech-
nology sharing. Firms decide whether to become OS or P, how much
to invest in product development, and the price of their products. For
rms electing the OS regime, a contractual arrangement (such as the
General Public License) forces them to share their improvements to the
main product if they want to benet from the contributions of other
OS rms. P rms, on the other hand, develop their products on their
own. Both kinds of rms sell a complementary good, the quality of
which depends on the individual investment in the development of the
primary good. Consumers value the quality of both goods (verticalOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 3
dierentiation) but also have idiosyncratic tastes for the products of
dierent rms (horizontal dierentiation).
Depending on parameter values, there are equilibria with both kinds
of rms and equilibria with only OS rms. When the consumer valua-
tion of the complementary good is low in comparison with the valuation
of the primary good, the equilibrium has both kinds of rms. In this
case, the market structure is asymmetric with few large P rms and
many small OS rms.
This nding is consistent with the observations of recent surveys.
Sepp a (2006) compares both kinds of rms, and nds that OS rms
tend to be younger and generally smaller than P rms. Bonaccorsi
and Rossi (2004) show that the most important motive for rms to
participate in OS projects is that it allows small rms to innovate.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When rms invest
in R&D, they increase the quality of both primary and complementary
goods. For OS rms, the primary good is non-rival, so they can ap-
propriate only a fraction of the quality increase. The complementary
good, on the other hand, is a private good so rms fully appropriate
the increase in quality. The key parameter in the model measures the
relative valuation of the primary good in comparison with the com-
plementary good, so it can also be interpreted as the degree of public
good of the investment in R&D.
When the relative valuation of the complementary good is high, the
public good problem is less important, and OS and P tend to have
similar investments and market shares. In this case, all rms decide
to be OS to benet from lower development costs. When the relative
valuation of the primary good is high, on the other hand, the public
good problem becomes more important and free riding implies lower
investment and market shares for OS rms. Nevertheless, OS rms still
benet from lower development costs. In equilibrium, higher market
shares and prices for P rms are compensated with higher development
costs and no rm nds it protable to deviate to become the other kind
(notice that we are talking about individual market shares, the total
market share of the OS project may be higher than the sum of market
shares of P rms).
A second result of the paper is the characterization of product quality
under the OS and P regimes. Individual investment in R&D may be
small for OS rms because of free-riding. However, P rms do not
share their technological advances, generating a duplication of eort.
As a consequence, either model may yield higher product quality in
equilibrium.4 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
We nd that when OS and P coexist the products of P rms are of
higher quality than those of OS rms. On the other hand, when all
rms are OS two things are possible: OS may prevent the entry of a
higher quality good or it may result in a product of higher quality than
that of a potential P rm. The latter is the case when the consumers'
valuation of the complementary good is high enough relative to the
valuation of the primary good.
Welfare will be suboptimal because of the public good problem in
OS and the duplication of eort of P rms. In Section 4, we show that
a subsidy to OS development can improve welfare not only because
it increases the investment in R&D, but also because it encourages
commercial rms to participate in OS, enhancing collaboration as a
result.
The equilibrium with OS and P rms is characterized by an asym-
metric market structure, even though all rms are ex-ante symmetric.
In Section 5 we argue that this result is even stronger if there are initial
asymmetries in rm size. Larger rms ex-ante have more incentives to
remain P, and the dierence in market shares between OS and P will
tend to increase.
The baseline model assumes symmetric consumer preferences for OS
and P products. However, given that OS rms sell the same primary
good, their products are likely to be more similar than those of P rms.
In Section 6 we modify the baseline model to allow for a higher cross-
price elasticity between OS products. We nd that the main result of
the paper still holds: when OS and P rms coexist, the market share of
P rms is higher than that of OS rms. However, in this case, we also
nd that if the substitutability between OS products is high enough,
there are equilibria with only P rms, and also multiple equilibria.
In the baseline model, we focus on the analysis of the investment in
the primary good, and we assume that the quality of the complemen-
tary good is determined by individual contributions on the primary
good, through a learning eect. In Section 7 we analyze what happens
when rms can invest directly in the complementary good. We show
that as the importance of the direct investment increases relative to the
learning eect, the number of rms in OS decreases. If the eect of di-
rect investment is high enough, the equilibrium has both kinds of rms
for all parameter values. Therefore, coexistence becomes more likely
when rms can invest in the complementary good without aecting the
quality of the primary good.
Finally, in Section 8 we study the equilibrium eects of partial and
full compatibility between the primary and complementary goods ofOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 5
dierent rms. In particular, P rms can sell the primary and comple-
mentary goods for a positive price, while the price of the OS primary
good is zero. We nd that as the degree of compatibility increases,
the market share and prots of P rms increase relative to those of
OS rms. This suggests that OS will be more successful when the
complementary good is more specic to the primary good, like in the
case of support and training services, customizations, platform-specic
software, and mobile devices (like MP3 players, PDAs or cell phones).
The model and the results are interesting for a variety of reasons.
First, endogenizing the participation decision is crucial for understand-
ing the motivations of commercial rms to participate in OS projects.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst analysis of direct
competition between for-prot OS and P rms. Third, we show there
are forces leading to an asymmetric market structure, even when all
rms are ex-ante symmetric. Fourth, we obtain conditions under which
OS can overcome free-riding and produce a good of high quality, even
without coordination of individual eorts. Finally, the model allows an
analysis of welfare and optimal policy.
It is important to remark that even though the model is specially
designed to analyze OS, it has wider applicability. In particular, it can
be used to analyze industries where rms cooperating in R&D coexist
with rms developing technologies on their own (read the literature
review for more details on the relation of this paper with the literature
of cooperation in R&D).
The main contribution of this paper is to present the rst tractable
model of competition between prot maximizing OS and P rms. As
such, the model captures the main ingredient shaping the decision to
share technologies with rivals or not: the trade-o between appropri-
ability and collaboration. We believe our paper is an important rst
step in the analysis of the behavior of prot maximizing OS rms. In
Section 9 we discuss interesting directions for further research.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.1. Open source in detail. There are clear antecedents of OS in
the history of technological change and innovation. Well documented
examples are the iron industry in Cleveland, UK (Allen 1983); the Cor-
nish pumping engine (Nuvolari 2004); the silk industry in Lyon (Foray
and Perez 2006); the Japanese cotton textile industry (Saxonhouse
1974); the paper industry in Berkshire, US (McGaw 1987); and the
case of the Viennese chair (Kyriazidou and Pesendorfer 1999). In all
these episodes, inventors shared their improvements with other inven-
tors, which led to a fast technical advance.6 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
One of the characteristics in common with OS is the presence of
complementarities. For example, in the case of the iron industry in
Cleveland, entrepreneurs were also owners or had mining rights of the
mines in the Cleveland district. Improvements in the eciency of blast
furnaces lead to an increase in the value of the iron ore deposit. In the
case of the Cornish engine, technical advances were publicized by mine
managers, stimulated to do so by the owners of these mines.
OS has been used to develop software since the early years of com-
puter science, but gained special relevance in the 1990s, with the success
of Linux, Apache and Sendmail, among other programs. Software pro-
grammers started to develop software as OS to avoid the restrictions
imposed by P rms on the access to the source code.
The participation of individual developers in OS is still very impor-
tant, but the same is true for commercial rms. In the case of embedded
Linux, for example, 73.5% of developers work for commercial rms and
contribute 90% of the total investment in code (Henkel 2006). Lakhani
and Wolf (2005) show that 55% of OS developers contribute code at
work, and these programmers contribute 50% more hours than the rest.
Lerner, Pathak, and Tirole (2006) show that around 30% of OS contrib-
utors work for commercial rms (however, they cannot identify non-US
commercial contributors). Moreover, they show that commercial rms
are associated with larger and more dynamic OS projects (commer-
cial contributors have four times more sensitivity to the growth of the
project).
The coexistence of OS and P in software markets is pervasive, as
can be seen in Table 1. The server operating system market is a good
example. According to IDC (2008), the market shares of server operat-
ing systems installed in new computer servers in 2008 were: Microsoft
38%, Unix 32.3%, Linux 13.7%, and other 16.1%. This shows that
Linux has a signicant market share in the market for server operat-
ing systems. However, there are reasons to think that Linux's market
share is underestimated by IDC. First, the measurement is a ow, not
a stock. Second, the operating system is very often changed by users
in the years following the acquisition of a computer server and Linux
is considered to run better on old computers. It is also interesting to
notice that most Unix systems nowadays are also OS. If we sum the
shares for Unix-like systems (Unix plus Linux), we get that OS oper-
ating systems have the largest share in the server operating systems
market.
The decision to become OS is aected by dynamic factors. For ex-
ample, the decision to open Netscape's source code was in part due to
the loss of market share to Internet Explorer. However, it is importantOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 7
Table 1: Coexistence of OS and P software.
Software Open Source Proprietary
Operating Systems Linux, OpenSolaris Windows
Web browsers Mozilla/Netscape Internet Explorer




Databases MySQL, PostgreSQL Oracle 11g, MS SQL Server
Content management Plone MS Sharepoint, Vignette
Application servers JBoss, Zope IBM WebSphere, MS .net
Blog publishing WordPress Windows Live Writer
to remark that in many opportunities, OS products were the rst to
be introduced in the market and then P products appeared. Moreover,
OS and P rms coexist even in newly developed software markets, like
application servers, blog publishing applications and content manage-
ment systems.
We think static models like ours can be used to study the equilib-
rium industry structure in this kind of markets. In particular, there
are several factors aecting the decision to become OS which can be
explained in the context of a simple static model, like the way in which
commercial OS rms prot from their collaborations, and the exact
role of free-riding and duplication of eort in determining equilibrium
market shares and cost of innovation.
Commercial rms participate in OS projects because they sell goods
and services complementary to the software. For example, IBM pro-
vides support for over 500 software products running on Linux, and
has more than 15,000 Linux-related customers worldwide.
1
The presence of complementarities in OS has been documented in
recent empirical work. Henkel (2006) presents results from a survey of
embedded Linux developers and show that 51.1% of developers work
for manufacturers of devices, chips or boards and 22.4% work for spe-
cialized software companies. Dahlander (2005) nds that the dominant
trend for appropriating the returns of innovation in OS is the sale of
a complementary service. Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Luzzi (2008) show
1www.ibm.com/linux/ (accessed May 12, 2009).8 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
that rms with larger stock of hardware patents and hardware trade-
marks are more likely to participate in OS.
The sale of a complementary service can indeed be protable. The
case of Red Hat is illustrative. According to its nancial statements, in
scal year 2009 Red Hat invested $130 million in R&D, and obtained
$652 million in revenues for its subscription and training services.
Many rms develop OS and P software at the same time. For ex-
ample, IBM contributes code to Linux, but makes most of its software
revenue in the middleware segment, where most of its programs are P.
Even Microsoft is becoming increasingly open, with its participation in
Cloud computing, for example. Our model can be used to address this
issue, by noticing that the complementary good sold by OS rms may
be a complementary P software. Another interesting issue would be to
analyze multiproduct software rms, and to determine which software
should be OS and which should be kept P. For the purposes of this
paper, however, we concentrate in the analysis of a particular software
segment, abstracting from the interactions with other segments.
OS licenses are the instruments guaranteeing the access of develop-
ers to the source code. Some licenses allow further modication of the
source code without imposing any restriction on developers. Restric-
tive OS licenses, on the other hand, require the disclosure of further
improvements to the source code when programs are distributed (pro-
grammers are still allowed to keep their innovations private if the pro-
gram is for personal use). The most popular OS license is the General
Public License (GPL), which is a restrictive license. The GPL is used
by Linux, MySQL, Perl and Java, for example. It is true that some OS
contributors disclose improvements to the source code even when these
modications are for personal use. However, restrictive licenses are the
most important means for the success of OS projects. For example, the
survey of embedded Linux developers nds that the main reason why
developers disclose their contributions to the code is because they are
forced to do so by the GPL (Henkel 2006).
1.2. Related literature. The rst papers on OS were mainly con-
cerned with explaining why individual developers contribute to OS
projects, apparently for free (read Lerner and Tirole 2005, von Krogh
and von Hippel 2006, for good surveys). The initial answers were al-
truism, personal gratication, peer recognition and career concerns.
The motivations of commercial OS rms, on the other hand, have been
studied less intensively.
Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002, 2005) present a description of OS and
identify directions for further research. Some of the questions relatedOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 9
with the present paper are: (i) what are the incentives of for-prot
rms to participate in OS, (ii) what development model provides higher
quality and welfare, and (iii) what is the inuence of the competitive
environment in OS. More importantly, these authors remark that direct
competition between P and OS rms has received little attention.
Existing papers addressing competition between the two paradigms
are duopoly models of a prot maximizing P rm and a community
of not-for-prot OS developers, selling at marginal cost (Mustonen
2003, Bitzer 2004, Gaudeul 2005, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
2006, Economides and Katsamakas 2006). Introducing prot-seeking
OS rms is important because it allows us to analyze the incentives to
invest in R&D and the decision to become OS or P. Other papers intro-
duce prot maximizing OS rms (Henkel 2004, Bessen 2006, Schmidtke
2006, Haruvy, Sethi, and Zhou 2008), but do not deal with direct com-
petition between the two paradigms. Moreover, all these papers are
exogenously assuming the market structure. The contributions of our
paper are: (i) to present an analysis of direct competition between for-
prot OS and P rms, (ii) when the decision to become OS or P is
endogenous, and (iii) the market structure is determined endogenously
as a result of rms' decisions.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature of cooperation in
R&D in Research Joint Ventures. A rst strand of papers analyzed the
eects of sharing R&D on the incentives to perform such investments
(D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992,
Suzumura 1992). In particular, Kamien, Muller, and Zang show that
free-riding incentives are so strong that a joint venture where rms
share R&D but do not coordinate their R&D levels has a lower total
investment than the individual investment of each one of these rms
when there is no cooperation in R&D. We show that this result can be
reversed if rms sell a complementary private good and the strength of
the complementarity is high enough.
A second strand of papers analyzed the endogenous formation of re-
search coalitions. Bloch (1995) presents a model in which rms decide
sequentially whether to join the association or not, and compete in
quantities after associations are formed. In equilibrium, two associa-
tions are formed. However, rms do not decide their optimal invest-
ments in R&D, so this model cannot be used to analyze the free-riding
incentives created by association. Poyago-Theotoky (1995) and Yi and
Shin (2000) assume that rms set their R&D levels cooperatively af-
ter associating. In this case, they show that rms in the joint venture
invest more in R&D, and have higher prots than outsiders. We show
this result is reversed when rms do not coordinate their R&D levels.10 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
A third strand of papers analyzed the endogenous determination of
spillovers among rms conducting R&D. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998)
show that rms selling complementary goods may choose maximal
spillovers (i.e. decide to be OS), even when they take their decisions
non-cooperatively. However, rms are not competing in the same in-
dustry. In our model, rms are direct competitors in the markets for
the primary and complementary goods. Amir, Evstigneev, and Wood-
ers (2003) present a duopoly model in which rms set cooperatively
their R&D levels and the strength of the spillover. In their model,
rms choose maximal spillovers, but this is due to the fact that they
take their decisions cooperatively.
As can be seen, the literature of cooperation in R&D is an important
precedent for our paper. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge,
previous papers have not analyzed the case of endogenous formation
of a coalition cooperating in R&D, when R&D levels are determined
non-cooperatively. In particular, our contribution to this literature is
the result that the equilibrium in which some rms decide to cooperate
and others do not is characterized by an asymmetric market structure,
where rms cooperating in R&D have smaller market shares.
2. The model
2.1. Technology. There are n rms selling packages composed of a
primary good (which is potentially OS) and a complementary private
good. Firms may improve the quality of both goods by investing in
a single R&D technology. Let xi be the investment in R&D of rm
i. The cost of the investment is cxi, which is a xed cost, and the
marginal cost of producing packages is zero.
The quality of the primary good depends on the investment of all
rms in the project. For P rms, quality is simply ai = ln(xi). For OS
rms, quality is aos = ln(i2os xi).
The quality of the complementary good is bi = ln(xi) for all rms.
There is a learning eect: rms improve the quality of their comple-
mentary good when they participate more in the development of the
primary good. For example, if a software rm participates more in an
OS project, it gains valuable knowledge and expertise and then can
oer a better support service.
2.2. Preferences. There is a continuum of consumers. Each consumer
has income y and buys only one package. Consumer j's indirect utility
from consuming package i is:
(1) vij = ai +  bi + y   pi + "ij;OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 11
where  is the valuation of the quality of the primary good,  is the val-
uation of the quality of the complementary good, pi is price, and "ij is
an idiosyncratic shock (unobservable by rms) representing the hetero-
geneity in tastes between consumers. This specication for preferences
allows for vertical (ai and bi) and horizontal ("ij) product dierentia-
tion.
Each consumer observes prices and qualities and then chooses the
package that yields the highest indirect utility. The total mass of con-
sumers is 1, so aggregate demands are equivalent to market shares.
To obtain closed-form solutions for the demands we make the fol-
lowing assumption, which corresponds to the multinomial logit model
(McFadden 1974, Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 1992):
Assumption 1. The idiosyncratic taste shocks "ij are i.i.d. according
to the double exponential distribution:
Pr("ij  z) = exp( exp(    z=))
where  is Euler's constant (  0:5772) and  is a positive constant.










ai +  bi   pi

:
The "ij's have zero mean and variance 22=6, hence  measures
the degree of heterogeneity between consumers. We will show that the








 measures the relative importance of vertical vs. horizontal product
dierentiation and  represents the relative importance of the primary
good vs. the complementary good ( can also be interpreted as the
degree of public good of the investment in R&D).
To guarantee the existence of a symmetric equilibrium we need enough
horizontal dierentiation relative to vertical dierentiation. Let  
 + , which is a sucient condition. Thus  2 [0;1].
2.3. Game and equilibrium concept. The model is a two-stage
non-cooperative game. The players are the n rms. In the rst stage
rms decide their type (OS or P), and in the second stage they make
their investment and price decisions (xi;pi).12 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
Given investments (quality) and prices, each consumer chooses her
optimal package. These decisions are summarized by consumer de-
mands (si) and embedded into the rms' payos: i = si pi   cxi.
The equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We will
only analyze symmetric equilibria, i.e. all rms deciding to be of the
same type in the rst stage will play the same equilibrium strategy in
the second stage.
2.4. Modeling assumptions. In this section we discuss the main as-
sumptions of the model, and the consequences of relaxing them.
Bundling and compatibility. We have assumed that rms sell packages
(bundles) composed of one unit of the primary good and one unit of the
complementary good. Under this assumption, the two goods become
eectively one and each rm sets only one price, which greatly simplies
the model and allows us to focus on the eects of technology sharing
on the decision to be P or OS.
Implicitly, we are assuming that (i) primary and complementary
goods are perfect complements, and (ii) complementary goods designed
for one primary good are incompatible with other primary goods. Un-
der these assumptions, each consumer must choose a primary good and
a complementary good from the same rm.
Industry examples and economic theory indicate that the incompat-
ibility assumption may be a good description for several markets in
which OS is important.
On the theory side, Matutes and Regibeau (1992) present a duopoly
model to study compatibility and bundling decisions. Each rm sells
two perfectly complementary components (consumers need one compo-
nent of each kind), and components may be compatible or incompatible
across rms. Matutes and Regibeau show there are equilibria where
rms choose to make their components incompatible in order to commit
to pure bundling.
There are many examples of incompatible components in the soft-
ware industry. For example, Red Hat specializes in providing support
services for Linux, and this support service has little value for Win-
dows users (likewise, Microsoft's support service has little value for
Linux users). Also, many applications that run in Mac OS X cannot
run in Windows, (and many applications for the iPhone do not run on
other mobile devices).
Clearly, the case of compatible components is also pervasive. For
example, MS Oce can be used in Macs, and Sun servers can run a
variety of operating systems (although they are designed to run bet-
ter on Sun's OpenSolaris). For this reason, in Section ?? we modifyOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 13
the model to analyze the partial compatibility and full compatibility
cases. Firms become multiproduct rms, and set separate prices for
the primary and complementary goods. P rms obtain revenues from
selling the primary and complementary goods, whereas OS rms only
obtain revenues from selling the complementary good (the price of the
primary good is zero).
For tractability, we assume there is only one P rm competing against
several OS rms,2 and we focus on the analysis of the equilibrium prices,
investments and market shares as a function of the degree of compati-
bility.
We nd that as goods become more compatible, the market share of
the OS complementary goods falls. Also, the prot of the P rm in-
creases relative to the prot of an OS rm. Therefore, OS will tend to
perform better when the complementary good is more specic to the
primary good, like in the case of support and training services, cus-
tomizations, platform-specic software, and mobile devices (like MP3
players, PDAs or cell phones).
Investment in the complementary good. In the baseline model, rms
cannot invest directly to increase the quality of the complementary
good. Instead, the quality of the complementary good increases with
individual investments in the primary good. This may happen because
there is a learning eect (the support service of a rm which contributes
more code to Linux is likely to be better than the support service of
a rm that contributes less), or because rms contribute in areas of
the primary good that are more relevant for their own complementary
goods (a rm selling nancial software will be more interested in de-
veloping Linux's mathematical capabilities, and will benet more from
these contributions than the rest).
As we will see, the assumption of a learning eect is not essential
for our key result {the existence of an equilibrium with both kinds of
rms, in which P rms have a larger market share and quality than
OS{ which obtains when the learning eect is small (even zero). In-
stead, the learning eect allows for the possibility that OS rms have
higher quality and market share than P rms, and for the existence of
equilibria with only OS rms, which will happen if the learning eect
is large enough.
However, it is interesting to ask what would happen if rms could
invest in the complementary good without contributing to the primary
2In general, models with multiproduct rms are usually very dicult to solve.
They usually consist of a duopoly game, and only symmetric equilibria are analyzed,
which limits applicability for the present case (n rms of two dierent types).14 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
good. In Section 7 we extend the basic model to allow for this possibil-
ity. Now, the quality of the complementary good is a weighted average
of the individual investment in the primary good (learning eect) and
the direct investment in the complementary good. We show that as the
importance of the direct investment increases relative to the learning
eect, the incentive to be OS decreases, and the model converges to
the equilibrium with both kinds of rms.
Demand specication. Logit demands follow from our assumption of
the double exponential distribution for the idiosyncratic taste term.
This distribution is similar to the normal distribution (which would
yield the probit model when applied to equation (1)), but has the ad-
vantage of providing an analytically tractable demand system whereas
the normal does not.
3
We have assumed a specic demand structure due to the diculty of
analyzing asymmetric equilibria. While we are condent that our re-
sults will continue to hold with other models of product dierentiation,
the formal extension of our analysis to a general demand system is by
no means straightforward. As a rst step, it therefore seems reason-
able to study a simple case, such as the logit, which provides explicit
expressions for the demand functions.
4
Given that taste shocks are distributed in the real line, every rm
will have some consumers with strong preferences for its products, and
therefore even rms with very low quality products will end up with
some positive demand. It could be argued that this is the reason why
OS rms may subsist in equilibrium, even when they have lower quality
than P rms. However, this argument would be only relevant if OS
rms were selling an extremely low quality product, which is never
a optimal decision whenever: (i) Inada conditions hold for the quality
3The logit is a common model in discrete choice theory (see, for example Ben-
Akiva and Lerman 1985), and has been widely used in econometric applications
(see Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987, and references therein), in marketing
(McFadden 1986), and in theoretical work (Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 1992,
Besanko, Perry, and Spady 1990, Anderson and de Palma 1992, Anderson and
Leruth 1993).
4Other alternatives for modelling an oligopoly with vertically and horizontally
dierentiated goods are the linear demand model and Salop's circular city with
exogenous locations. We have studied the linear demands case, and have found
that results still hold under this alternative specication. However, the analysis
becomes much more complex. An appendix with the analysis of the linear demand
case may be obtained from the authors upon request. The circular city model would
add additional complications because the equilibrium would depend on whether OS
and P rms were selling neighboring goods or not.OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 15
improving technologies, (ii) rms can appropriate some fraction of their
investment.
5
Finally, the assumption that the taste shocks are i.i.d. across pack-
ages implies that the dierentiation between OS and P rms is symmet-
ric. However, OS packages share the same primary good, so they are
likely to be more similar than P packages. In Section 6 we introduce
a nested logit model to introduce a dierence in the substitutability
between OS and P rms.
We nd that as OS packages become more similar, the equilibrium
number of rms in OS decreases. Depending on parameter values,
the equilibrium may have only OS rms, only P rms, or both kinds
of rms. If the dierence in substitutability is high enough, all rms
will decide to be P in equilibrium. This extension provides an impor-
tant result: we should expect to see a higher proportion of OS rms
in industries where rms have more possibilities to dierentiate their
complementary goods.
3. Solution of the model
3.1. Second stage. Let nos be the number of rms deciding to be
OS in the rst stage. In the second stage, rms choose pi and xi
to maximize i = si pi   cxi, taking as given the demands and the
decisions of other rms.
Working with the rst order conditions and imposing symmetry we




















The term inside the parenthesis of (4) represents free-riding: assum-
ing sos = sp, OS have less incentives to invest than P because they can
appropriate a smaller fraction of their investment. In other words, there
is a public good problem given that OS are sharing their technological
advances.
5This condition holds if there is at least one P rm or  > 0. There is zero
appropriability only if all rms are OS and  = 0, but in this case the comparison
between OS and P quality is irrelevant.16 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
From (2), we can get the ratio of market shares sos=sp. Introducing
equations (3) to (5), taking logs and rearranging terms we get:


















+   ln(nos):
This equation says that the dierence in market shares depends on
the resolution of the conict between free-riding and duplication of
eort. To see this, notice that the left hand side is increasing in sos
and decreasing in sp, so the dierence in market shares will increase if
the right hand side does. The rst term on the right hand side is just
the dierence between xos and xp (free-riding). The second term is a
multiplicative eect due to the elimination of the duplication of eort
in OS (collaboration eect).
The second-stage equilibrium is completely characterized by (6) and
the condition that the sum of the market shares is equal to 1:
(7) nos sos + (n   nos)sp = 1:
Proposition 1. A second-stage equilibrium exists and is unique. Given
nos, the equilibrium market shares solve (6) and (7).
In what follows we study the comparative statics of the second-stage
equilibrium. In Lemma 1 we present a simple condition to determine
which kind of rm will have higher market share (quality and price).
Lemma 1. sp > sos if  > ^ (nos;n), and sp < sos in the opposite case,













The comparison of prices and quality is equivalent to the comparison
of market shares: if sos > sp, then pos > pp and aos +  bos > ap +
 bp, and vice versa. Lemma 1 provides an important result: as nos or
n increase, it is more likely that OS rms will have higher market share
(quality and price) than P rms.
Lemmas 2 and 3 analyze the eects of changes in  and  on sos.
The eects on sp have the opposite sign.
Lemma 2. sos is increasing in  if  < ^ (nos;n), and decreasing in 
in the opposite case.OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 17
Lemma 2 has a clear interpretation. When  increases, vertical dif-
ferentiation gets more important relative to horizontal dierentiation.
This means that investing in R&D has a larger eect on demand, which
benets rms with higher quality products. If  < ^ , then the rms
with a higher quality product are the OS rms, and therefore, their
market share increases relative to the market share of the P rms. The
opposite happens when  > ^ .
Lemma 3. There exists d 2 (0; ^ ) such that sos is increasing in  for
 < d, and decreasing in  for  > d.
Lemma 3 implies that the graph of sos with respect to  (the degree
of public good of the investment) is hump-shaped. For low values of
, collaboration dominates free-riding (investment is mostly private),
so sos is increasing in . For high values of , free-riding dominates
collaboration and sos is decreasing in .
3.2. First stage. In the rst stage of the game, rms decide whether
to be OS or P, taking as given the decisions of the rest of rms and
forecasting their equilibrium payos in the second stage. Let (nos) be
the second stage equilibrium payos when nos rms decide to be OS.
Replacing the second stage equilibrium values of prices and investments













(1   (1   sp)); (9)
where sos = sos(nos) and sp = sp(nos) are the second stage equilibrium
market shares. Equilibrium prots are always positive, given that ,
, sos and sp are all between 0 and 1. Comparing equations (8) and
(9), we can see the direct eect of collaboration in prots, which is
the saving in the investment cost of OS rms (third term inside the
parenthesis of the rst equation).
A number nos of rms in OS is an equilibrium if and only if os(nos) 
p(nos  1) and p(nos)  os(nos +1). These conditions are what
D'Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983) called in-
ternally stable and externally stable coalition conditions. The rst
inequality says that rms deciding to be OS cannot gain by deviating
and becoming P. The second inequality is a similar condition on the
decision of being P. The equilibrium conditions can be summarized by18 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE











1   ~ sp
(1   (1   ~ sp));
where sos = sos(nos) and ~ sp = sp(nos   1). Using this function, the
equilibrium conditions can be restated as f(nos)  0 and f(nos+1)  0.
The equilibrium may be such that both kinds of rms coexist (inte-
rior equilibrium) or all rms choose to be of the same kind. nos = 0
is always an equilibrium. For nos = 1 to be an equilibrium we need
f(2)  0. Likewise, for nos = n to be an equilibrium we need f(n)  0.
Proposition 2. A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium for the two-stage game
exists and is unique.
Figure 1 shows an example of the f(nos) schedule for  = 1,  = 0:9,
 = 1 and n = 10. In this case, the equilibrium has 6 rms in OS.
Figure 1: Equilibrium number of rms in OS.
When rms choose between OS or P, they compare the relative ben-
ets of collaboration and secrecy. There are two elements associated
with this trade-o. On one hand, free-riding and collaboration aect
the equilibrium market shares, as analyzed in Section 3.1. On the other
hand, OS rms have a lower investment cost. Being P will be more
protable than being OS only if free-riding is suciently strong as to
overcome the positive eects of collaboration.
The following proposition characterizes the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the two-stage game, depending on the value of .OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 19
Proposition 3. Given n > 3 and , there exist 0 <   < ^  < 1, such
that in equilibrium:
i. If  > ^ , both kinds of rms co-exist and P have higher quality
and market share than OS.
ii. If   <   ^ , all rms decide to be OS, but a P rm would have
higher quality and market share.
iii. If    , all rms decide to be OS, and a P rm would have
lower quality and market share.
Proposition 3 is the most important result of the paper. It shows
there are three kinds of equilibria. For high  the degree of public good
of the investment in R&D is high. In this case, there is an interior
equilibrium with both kinds of rms, where the quality of P goods is
higher than that of OS goods. For intermediate values of , all rms
decide to be OS. However, if one of the rms would become P, it would
produce a good of higher quality than the OS rms. This means that
OS is preventing the entry of a product of better quality. Finally, for
low  the public good problem is not very important, so all rms decide
to be OS, but OS quality is higher than that of a potential deviator.
Figure 2 shows the regions corresponding to the three equilibria for
dierent values of n and , and for  = 1. The area corresponding
to equilibria with coexistence rst increases but then decreases with
n. This means that large numbers favor cooperation, even without
coordination of individual investments.
Figure 2: Equilibrium regions.
3.3. Open membership and OS licenses. In this section we ana-
lyze the eects of changes in nos on prots. Figure 3 shows the prot20 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
schedules of P and OS rms for  = 1,  = 1 and n = 10. We can see
that os increases, keeps approximately constant for some values of nos
and nally increases again. Interestingly, at the equilibrium (nos = 6),
the prots of OS rms are increasing in nos, which means that OS
rms would not nd it protable to limit access to the OS project.
This gives a rationale for OS licenses, such as the GPL, guaranteeing
open membership in OS projects (as we explained above, the only re-
striction in the GPL is that whenever modications to the program are
distributed, they have to be made available to the rest of developers in
the project).
Figure 3: Firm prots as functions of nos.
Simulations show that the prot of OS rms is increasing in nos at
the equilibrium for any  and . Interestingly, the prot of P rms
is also increasing when the equilibrium has both kinds of rms. This
means that both OS and P prefer to compete against OS rms rather
than P rms.
Notice that the result holds even though OS rms are direct com-
petitors in the markets for the primary and complementary goods. If
the rms were not direct competitors but were beneting from the de-
velopment of the OS good, the result would be even stronger. However,
the result also depends on the fact that the number of rms in the in-
dustry is xed. If free-entry into the project would stimulate the entry
of new rms in the industry the result could be reversed.OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 21
4. Welfare analysis
One of the advantages of the logit model is that it can be used to
construct a representative consumer whose utility embodies the aggre-
gate behavior of the continuum of users (Anderson, De Palma, and
Thisse 1992).
Let si be the quantities of each variety consumed by the representa-
tive consumer, and let
P
si = 1. Total income is y and s0 represents




(ai +  bi)si   
X
si ln(si) + s0:
This utility embodies two dierent eects. The rst term represents
the direct eect from consumption of the n varieties, in the absence
of interactions. The second term introduces an entropy-eect, which
expresses the preference for variety of the representative consumer.
The utility function is quasilinear, which implies transferable utility.
Thus, social welfare is the sum of consumer utility and rm prots:
(10) W =
X
(ai +  bi)si   
X
si ln(si) + y  
X
cxi:
The Social Planner's problem is to maximize (10) subject to
P
si =
1. It is obvious that the Social Planner would have all the rms sharing
their improvements to the primary good. Also, given the concavity and
symmetry of the utility function, the social planner will set si = 1=n
for all i. To determine the optimal investment, the Social Planner
maximizes
W =  ln(nx
) +  ln(x
) + ln(n) + y   ncx
;
which leads to an optimal investment equal to x = ( + )=cn.
Product quality is suboptimal regardless of the number of OS and
P rms: OS is subject to free-riding, which leads to a suboptimal
investment in R&D, but P rms do not share their improvements on
the primary good, generating an inecient duplication of eort.
4.1. Government policy. Now we turn to an analysis of government
policy. We will show that the rst best can be achieved by using a tax-
subsidy scheme. The cost of R&D for OS is cos = (1 )c, where  is
a proportional subsidy on the investment of OS rms. This subsidy, in
turn, is nanced by proportional or lump-sum taxes paid by consumers.
The ratio of investments of OS and P rms is
xos
xp










;22 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
and the equation characterizing the equilibrium market shares becomes

















+   ln(nos)    ln(1   ):
An increase in the subsidy increases the dierence in investments
and market shares between OS and P, and also decreases the cost of
investment for OS, so rms are more tempted to become OS. The
following lemma is equivalent to Lemma 1 and shows that if the subsidy
is high enough, OS rms will have a higher market share than P in a
second stage equilibrium.
Lemma 4. sos > sp in a second-stage equilibrium if











and sp > sos in the opposite case.
In particular, if  > 1   (1   n(n   2)(n   1) 2)(n   1), then
sos > sp for nos = n   1, and therefore all rms want to be OS.
The following proposition shows the optimal policy.
Proposition 4. The optimal subsidy is  = , which attains the rst
best levels of investment. In equilibrium, all rms decide to be OS.
The subsidy has a double eect: it increases the investment of OS
rms, and it encourages P rms to become OS (to share R&D). The
optimal subsidy is increasing in the degree of public good of the invest-
ment in R&D. In other words, the subsidy should be higher for projects
where the valuation of the complementary good is not very high.
Note that in our model, lump-sum or proportional taxes are equiv-
alent. This is because each consumer buys one product, and therefore
proportional taxes do not aect quantities sold. This is why nancing
the subsidy with proportional taxes does not cause a deadweight loss
and the policy-maker can achieve the rst best.
5. Initial asymmetries
We have assumed rms are ex-ante symmetric, which allowed us to
concentrate on ex-post dierences arising endogenously in the model.
However, it would be interesting to analyze what happens when there
are initial asymmetries, which could be due to initial dierences in the
stock of R&D or installed base.OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 23
Specically, suppose all rms are initially P and have dierent stocks
of R&D. Firms can increase quality by investing in R&D, and have to
choose to become OS or remain P. Firms deciding to become OS will
have to share not only their current investment in R&D, but also their
initial stocks.
For P rms, initial dierences will persist ex-post. Larger rms may
invest more or less than smaller rms, but will nish with a larger
stock of R&D. Firms deciding to be OS, on the other hand, will tend
to be more similar because they have to share their initial R&D stocks.
This means that larger rms will have less incentives to become OS.
In equilibrium, rms deciding to be OS will be smaller ex-ante and ex-
post. The reason is twofold: larger rms ex-ante have more incentives
to remain P, and P rms have more incentives to maintain a larger
stock of R&D ex-post.
6. Lower differentiation for OS products
Given that OS packages share the same primary good, they are likely
to be more similar than P packages. To introduce this dierence in
the degree of substitutability, we use a nested logit model (Ben-Akiva
1973). This adds an element of endogenous horizontal dierentiation to
the trade-o between collaboration and secrecy. By becoming P, rms
get their product more dierentiated in comparison with OS rms.
The main consequences are that (i) the equilibrium number of rms
in OS will be smaller than in the previous model, (ii) there are equi-
libria with only P rms, and (iii) there are parameter values leading to
multiple equilibria.
Consumers are heterogeneous in two dierent dimensions: they have
idiosyncratic tastes for the primary good and idiosyncratic tastes for
the complementary good. Dierences in substitutability will be driven
by the relative strength of these two forces. Following the nested logit
representation of Cardell (1997), consumer j's indirect utility from con-
suming package i, based on primary good k is:
vij = ak +  bi + y   pi +  kj + (1   )"ij;
where kj is a primary good idiosyncratic component, and  2 [0;1]
weighs the dierent idiosyncratic components. Assumption 2 replaces
Assumption 1 for the standard logit case.
Assumption 2. The idiosyncratic components "ij, corresponding to
complementary good i, are i.i.d. according to the double exponential
distribution with scale parameter . The idiosyncratic components kj,
corresponding to primary good k, are i.i.d. according to a distribution24 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
such that  kj +(1 )"ij is distributed double exponential with scale
parameter .
Assumption 2 implies that the horizontal dierentiation term  kj+
(1   )"ij has the same distribution than "ij in the previous model.
Cardell shows there is a unique distribution for kj such that Assump-
tion 2 holds.
The parameter  determines the relative strength of the horizontal
dierentiation forces. As  increases, consumers get more dierentiated
in their tastes for the primary good, and less dierentiated in their
tastes for the complementary good. When  = 0 consumers only have
idiosyncratic preferences for the complementary good, and the model
becomes the standard logit model of previous sections. When  = 1
consumers only have idiosyncratic preferences for the primary good,
and all OS rms sell a homogeneous good.
The proportion of consumers choosing OS variant i can be decom-
posed in the following way:
(11) si = sijos Sos;
where Sos is the aggregate market share of the OS primary good, and
sijos is the share of OS variant i within the OS project.
Under Assumption 2, i's market share within the OS project depends











 bi   pi
(1   )
:
The aggregate market share Sos depends on the average value of the
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
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This is because P nests are composed only by one P product (i.e. the
average value of the nest is the value of that product).
The optimal price and investment of P rms have the same functional
forms as before. The optimal price and investment of OS rms become:
pos =






















From (12) and (11), we obtain the ratio of market shares sos=sp.





























A + (    ) ln(nos):
As in the standard logit case, to guarantee the existence of a sym-
metric equilibrium we need enough horizontal dierentiation relative to
vertical dierentiation. We assume (1   )   + , which is a su-
cient condition. This implies that   1 . Proposition 5 summarizes
the equilibrium of the second-stage of the game.
Proposition 5. A second-stage equilibrium for the nested model exists
and is unique. Given nos, the equilibrium market shares solve (15) and
(7).
Comparing equations (6) and (15), we can see that the higher substi-
tutability between OS varieties has three eects on equilibrium market
shares. First, there is a lower investment of OS due to the lower return
to investment (rst term on the right hand side of (15)). Second, there
is a direct negative eect on the average value of the complementary
good (second term on the right hand side of (15)). Consumers care for
variety, and therefore the value of choosing an OS package decreases
when the complementary good becomes less dierentiated. Third, OS
rms will set a lower price in equilibrium because of higher substi-
tutability (second term on the left hand side of (15)). The rst two
eects tend to reduce the market share of OS relative to P, and the
third eect tends to increase it.26 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
To solve the rst stage of the game, we calculate f(nos) = os(nos) 
p(nos  1), where (nos) = pi si  cxi. The equilibrium conditions are
the same than in the standard logit case.
Figure 4 shows the graph of f(nos) for dierent parameter values.
There are three interesting observations to be made. First, as  in-
creases for given  and  (OS varieties become more similar), the equi-
librium number of rms in OS decreases (Figure 4a). Second, if 
is high enough, there are equilibria with only P rms (Figure 4b).
Third, for some parameter values the model exhibits multiple equilib-
ria (in Figure 4c there is an equilibrium with nos = 2 and another with
nos = 10). In this case, there may be a coordination problem if the OS
project fails to attract a large number of contributors.
(a) Decrease in nos when  increases. (b) All P Equilibrium.
(c) Multiple Equilibria.
Figure 4: Equilibrium of the nested logit model.
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium regions for dierent values of  and ,
given  = 0:6,  = 1 and n = 10 (in case of multiple equilibria we take
the equilibrium with highest nos). OS will subsist if the dierentiation
between OS varieties is high enough ( is low enough). Also, there areOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 27
values of  such that as  increases the equilibrium goes from all OS, to
coexistence and then to all P. For coexistence, we need a combination
of low  and high . Finally, our simulations show that whenever OS
and P coexist, the quality and market share of P rms is larger than
that of OS rms, which means that the main result of the paper still
holds.
Figure 5: Equilibrium regions for the nested logit.
7. Direct investment in the complementary good
In the baseline model, the quality of the complementary good is
determined by individual investments in the primary good (xi). This
means that rms cannot increase the quality of the complementary
good without increasing the quality of the primary good at the same
time.
In this section, we extend the basic model to allow for direct invest-
ment in the complementary good. The indirect utility of consumer j
from consuming package i is still:
vij = ai +  bi + y   pi + "ij;
where ai = ln(xi) for P rms and aos = ln(i2os xi) for OS rms, but
now, bi = ! ln(xi) + (1   !)ln(zi) for all rms, where zi is the direct
investment in the complementary good, and ! 2 [0;1] measures the
importance of the learning eect vis-a-vis the direct investment. The
total cost of the investment is c(xi + zi).
Demands are still given by (2), and rms maximize  = pi si c(xi+
zi). Equilibrium price is:
pi =

1   si28 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
for all rms, and equilibrium investments in the primary good for OS














 + 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sp:
Finally, equilibrium investment in the complementary good is:
zi =




An increase in the importance of direct investment with respect to
the learning eect will decrease the optimal investment in the primary
good and increase the optimal investment in the complementary good,
for given si. Substituting prices and investments in the ratio of market





















+   ln(nos);
where  and  are dened as in Section 2.2. Notice that we can get
the baseline model by making ! = 1 in equation (16). As ! decreases,
the market share of OS rms decreases for given nos. Thus, the change
in the composition of investments as ! decreases has a higher impact
on OS rms because of the lower appropriability of the investment in
the primary good.
To solve the rst stage of the game, we calculate f(nos) = os(nos) 
p(nos  1), where (nos) = pi si  cxi. The equilibrium conditions are
the same than in the baseline model.
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium for  = 0:9,  = 0:7, n = 10, and
dierent values of !. We can see that as ! decreases, the equilibrium
number of rms in OS decreases. In the limit, when ! = 0, the equi-
librium has both kinds of rms (coexistence). Simulations show that
this result holds for any value of  and .
The analysis of this section shows the eects of allowing rms to
invest solely in the complementary good. Direct investment in the
complementary good is fully appropriable. As the importance of this
kind of investment relative to the learning eect increases, the quality
dierential between OS and P rms decreases, reducing the incentives
to participate in OS. However, the main result of the paper still holds:
there are parameter values for which both kinds of rms coexist inOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 29
Figure 6: Equilibria with direct investment in the complementary good.
equilibrium, and these equilibria are characterized by an asymmetric
market structure, with a few large P rms and many small OS rms.
8. Compatibility between OS and P
In previous sections, we assumed that complementary goods could
only be used with the primary good for which they were developed. In
this section, we analyze what happens when complementary goods can
be combined with any primary good, that is, when OS and P goods
are compatible.
A direct implication is that primary and complementary goods will
have separate prices. Let rk be the price of primary good k, and pi be
the price of complementary good i. P rms can set a positive price for
both goods. OS rms, on the other hand, are selling an homogeneous
primary good, and price competition implies that ros = 0. Therefore,
OS rms can set a positive price only for the complementary good.
As a result of compatibility, the model becomes highly complex.
Therefore, to keep the model tractable, we will assume there is only
one P rm, competing against nos OS rms. In other words, we will x
the number of OS and P rms and we will focus on studying equilibrium
investment and pricing decisions on the second stage of the previous
models.
The model is based on the nested logit. There are two nests, one
corresponding to users of the OS primary good, and the other corre-
sponding to users of the P primary good. Within each nest, consumers
can choose between the complementary goods of all rms.30 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
The quality of the OS primary good is aos = ln(i2os xi) and the
quality of the P primary good is ap = ln(xi), where xi are individual
investments in the primary good.
The quality of the complementary good is determined by a learning
eect as in the basic model, but this learning eect is discounted when
the complementary good is used with the primary good for which it
was not developed. Specically, the quality of complementary good i
developed for primary good k is bik = ln(xi) when used with k, and
bik0 = ln(xi) when used with k0 6= k.
 2 [0;1] measures the degree of compatibility between the primary
and complementary goods of dierent rms. When  = 0, goods of
dierent rms are incompatible, and we obtain the model of previous
sections. 0 <  < 1 implies partial compatibility, and  = 1 implies
full compatibility.
Consumer j's indirect utility from consuming good i with primary
good k is:
vkij = ak +  bik + y   rk   pi +  kj + (1   )"ij:
The distributions of the taste shocks kj and "ij are given in Assump-
tion 2.
Let Sos and Sp be the market shares of the OS and P primary goods.
The market share of complementary good i can be decomposed in the
following way:
si = Sos sijos + Sp sijp;
where sijos is the market share of rm i inside the OS nest, and sijp is
the market share of rm i inside the P nest.










 bik   pi
(1   )
:
As in Section 6, the market share inside a nest depends only on the
relative quality and price of the dierent complementary goods. This
is true for OS and P rms. The only dierence is that now all rms
sell complementary goods in both nests.
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and Sp = 1   Sos, where Vos and Vp are the average values of the
complementary goods within each nest:
















The prot of OS rms is os = si pi   cxi, whereas the prot of the
P rm is p = sp pp + Sp rp   cxp. Notice that when  = 0, Sp = sp
and the P rm chooses a single price equal to pp + rp, as in previous
sections. As in Section 6, we assume  < 1   , which guarantees the
quasiconcavity of the maximization problem of OS and P rms.
The optimal price and investment for OS rms are:
pos =
(1   )













The optimal price for the primary and complementary good of the
P rm, and its optimal investment are:
pp =
(1   )sijos












Replacing optimal prices and investments into the market share
equations, and noticing that Sp = 1   Sos, spjos = 1   nos sosjos, and
spjp = 1   nos sosjp, we can get a system of three equations with three
unknowns characterizing the equilibrium market shares. These equi-
librium expressions are dicult to analyze because of their analytical
complexity. Therefore, it is useful to begin by analyzing the full com-
patibility case ( = 1), which provides a tractable set of equilibrium
conditions.32 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
8.1. Full compatibility. When  = 1, si = sijos = sijp and equilib-












































































































The equilibrium is characterized by the previous equations and the
condition that the sum of market shares is equal to 1:
Sos + Sp = 1; (19)
nos sos + sp = 1: (20)
Proposition 6. A symmetric equilibrium for the full compatibility case
exists and is unique. Equilibrium market shares solve (17) to (20). In
equilibrium, sp  sos and Sos  Sp, and the prot of the P rm is
always higher than the prot of an OS rm.
It is important to remark that the result that Sos > Sp for all pa-
rameter values depends on the fact that there is only one P rm, and
may not longer hold if we introduce more P rms in the market.
Lemma 6 provides simple results which can be compared with those
of the nested logit model of Section 6, where it is assumed that  = 0.
When  = 0, OS rms could have a higher market share and prots
than P rms, depending on ,  and . When  = 1, on the otherOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 33
hand, the complementary goods market share and prot of the P rms
will always be higher than the market share of OS rms.
These results suggest that OS will perform better when the comple-
mentary good is more specic to the primary good. Good examples
of these kinds of complementary goods are support and training ser-
vices, customizations, platform-specic software, and mobile devices
(like MP3 players, PDAs or cell phones), among others.
8.2. Partial compatibility. We now turn to the analysis of the ef-
fects of changes in  on the equilibrium. As  increases, the degree
of specicity of the complementary goods decreases. This means that
OS rms tend to have similar market shares in the OS and P primary
goods markets, and therefore have less incentives to invest in the pri-
mary good. The P rm, on the other hand, keeps its incentives to
invest in the primary good because it sells this good for a positive
price. Therefore, as  increases, the investment of the P rm increases
relative to the investment of the OS rms.
The above argument implies that as  increases, we should see an
increase in the market shares of the primary and complementary goods
of the P rm, and also an increase in the prots of the P rm relative
to the prot of the OS rms.
Figure 7 shows the eects of changes in  on the natural logarithm
of the ratios sos=sp, Sos=Sp and os=p, for nos = 10,  =,  =,  = 1,
 = and c = 1. We can see that these three ratios decrease with ,
which conrms our previous assertions. Our simulations for dierent
values of the parameters indicate that Sos=Sp > 1 for all .
Figure 7: Eects of changes in  on equilibrium.34 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
In Figure 7, OS rms have higher market shares in the complemen-
tary goods and higher prots than the P rm for small , but have
lower market shares and prots for high . More generally, we know
that sos=sp and os=p may be larger or smaller than 1 when  = 0,
which depends on ,  and . However, what is more important is
that these two ratios are decreasing in  and that they will always be
smaller than 1 when  = 1, by Lemma 6.
Finally, it is important to remark that introducing compatibility
strengthens our results of an asymmetric market structure, where P
rms have a higher market share than OS rms (in the complementary
goods market).
9. Conclusion
This paper investigates the motivations of commercial rms to par-
ticipate in OS, and the implications of direct competition between OS
and P rms on R&D investments and equilibrium market shares. We
present a model in which rms decide whether to become OS or P
and their investment in R&D and price. Both kinds of rms sell pack-
ages composed by a primary good (like software) and a complementary
private good (like support and training services or hardware). The dif-
ference between both kinds of rms is that OS share their investments
in R&D, while P develop their products on their own.
Our main contribution is to determine conditions under which OS
and P coexist in equilibrium. These equilibria are characterized by
an asymmetric market structure: P rms invest more in R&D and
obtain a larger market share than OS rms. OS rms, on the other
hand, benet from lower development costs. We also show that the
results are robust to the introduction of initial asymmetries in rm
size, lower dierentiation among OS varieties, direct investment in the
complementary good, and compatibility.
Our model points to several important characteristics of OS. In par-
ticular, the success of OS will depend on (i) the strength of the com-
plementarity between primary and complementary goods, and (ii) the
possibility to dierentiate the rm's OS variant from other OS and P
products, (iii) the size of the learning eect when investing in the pri-
mary good, and (iv) the degree of compatibility between the primary
and complementary goods of dierent rms.
The welfare analysis shows the equilibrium is suboptimal for two
reasons: there is too little collaboration (caused by P rms) and too
little investment in R&D (caused by OS rms). We show that a subsidy
to OS development can improve welfare not only because it increasesOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 35
the investment in R&D, but also because it encourages commercial
rms to participate in OS, enhancing collaboration as a result. This
explains the active involvement of governments in promoting OS.
There is a large need for more empirical research on OS. This paper
provides several testable implications, among which are the following:
1. OS rms should tend to have smaller investment and market
share than P rms.
2. The market share of OS should be higher when:
i. the degree of complementarity between the primary and
complementary goods is higher,
ii. the degree of horizontal product dierentiation is higher,
iii. initial dierences in market shares and investments are
smaller, and
iv. complementary goods are primary good-specic (the de-
gree of compatibility between goods of dierent rms is
small).
Our objective was to present a tractable model to analyze the coex-
istence of OS and P rms. We believe our paper is an important rst
step in the analysis of the behavior of prot maximizing rms in OS,
which can be extended in several directions. First, the model could be
modied to endogenize bundling and compatibility decisions. Second,
consumer preferences could be modied to introduce network eects.
Third, an important technological dierence between OS and P rms
is that OS benet more from user innovation than P rms. In OS,
users can access the source code, which allows them to customize the
software program to their needs, and also to correct bugs at a faster
rate.
OS is a promising and exciting area of research, which deserves fur-
ther study. We believe this paper contributes to our understanding of
this phenomenon, particularly in those aspects related to the design of
an optimal business strategy.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Theorems in Text
Proposition 1. A second-stage equilibrium exists and is unique. Given nos, the
equilibrium market shares solve (6) and (7).












pi   c  0 with equality if xi > 0. (22)
For the moment, assume that pi > 0 and xi > 0 in equilibrium, so the rst order
conditions hold with equality. Later, we will show there are no corner equilibria.
Working with equation (21) we get the optimal price:
(23) pi = =(1   si):
Equation (23) holds for both kinds of rms (OS and P). To nd the optimal






































Here we can see that the dierence between both kinds of rms is the public good
nature of ai for OS rms. The improvement in the quality of the primary good
due to rm i's investment benets the rest of OS rms and therefore the increase
in market share is less than what it would be if the rm was P.
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where  = aos +  bos   ap    bp represents quality dierences. From the
denitions of a and b:





+  ln(nos): (29)
From equations (26), (28) and (29), we get equation (6), which is an implicit
equation determining the relation of market shares between OS and P rms in
equilibrium. This equation, together with the equation establishing that the sum
of the market shares is equal to 1, completely characterizes the equilibrium.
Now we will show there are no corner solutions (xi > 0 and pi > 0 in the
symmetric equilibrium). If pi = 0, then prots are zero and the rm would nd
protable to increase pi. To analyze xi = 0 we have to specify what happens with
si when xi = 0. Assume that if xi = 0 and xj > 0 for at least one j 6= i, then
si = 0. When xi = 0 for all i, on the other hand, si =
exp( pi=) P
exp( pi=). There are
3 cases: xp = 0 and xos > 0, xp > 0 and xos = 0, and xp = 0 and xos = 0. If
xp = 0 and xos > 0, then sp = 0 and a P rm makes zero prots. But a P rm can
deviate to pi =

1 si and xi =
si(+)
c with si > 0. Such a deviation is protable
if si > 1   1
 which always holds. If xp > 0 and xos = 0, then sos = 0 and an OS
rm makes zero prots. But an OS rm can deviate to pi =

1 si and xi =
si(+)
c
obtaining positive prots. If xp = 0 and xos = 0, then sp = sos = 1
n. An OS or a P
can deviate to xi =  > 0 obtaining a discontinuous jump in revenue (si = 1) and
a small increase in costs.
Finally, to show existence and uniqueness, we need to prove two things: (1) there
is only one xed point of the system of equations in Proposition 1 (there is only one
symmetric equilibrium), and (2) the prot function is concave at the equilibrium
(the second order conditions for optimality hold).
Let's rst show there is only one xed point in term of equilibrium market shares.
Dene the function g(sos) by plugging equation (7) in equation (6).







(1   ) + 




    ln(nos)  
n   nos





By construction, sos solves equations (6) and (7) if and only if g(sos) = 0. Ex-
istence follows from a standard application of the mean value theorem. First,
limsos!0 g(sos) =  1 and limsos! 1
nos g(sos) = 1. Then, continuity of g implies
there exists at least one sos such that g(sos) = 0. Next, we will show there exists
only one such sos. For this, it is sucient to show that g is strictly increasing, for40 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE





sos(1   nos sos)
+
  (nos 1)=(1   sos)




(1 + nos(1   sos)   n)2 +
1
(1   sos)2:
All terms are positive because sosnos  1. It follows that there exists a unique
(sos;sp) solving the system of equations.
To prove that the prot function is concave at the equilibrium candidate, we will
evaluate the determinant of the Hessian of the prot function at the equilibrium
price and market share, and show that it is positive denite. The determinants of
































A sucient condition for both determinants to be positive is   +, which has
been assumed throughout the paper. Thus, the concavity of the prot function at
the equilibrium is guaranteed for both kinds of rms.
Lemma 1. sp > sos if  > ^ (nos;n), and sp < sos in the opposite case, where






















































Rearranging this expression we get the desired result.






























os   1)2 (n
os   1   (nos 1)) (32)
First, we will show that @h
@  0, which is enough to determine that ^  is increasing
in n. @h
@  0 if and only if n
os   1  ln(n
os). Let x = n
os, f1(x) = x   1 and
f2(x) = ln(x). x ranges from 1 to nos. When x = 1, f1 = f2, but then f1 grows
faster than f2 for any x. This means that n
os   1  ln(n
os) and @h
@  0.OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 41
Next, we will show that @h
@nos  0, which implies that ^  is increasing in nos
following a simple application of the implicit function theorem. @h
@nos  0 if and
only if  (nos  1)  n
os  1. Let g1() =  (nos  1) and g2() = n
os  1. It is easy
to check that g1(0) = g2(0), g1(1) = g2(1), and that both functions are increasing
but g2 is strictly convex and g1 is linear. Therefore, g1()  g2() and @h
@nos  0.
Lemma 2. sos is increasing in  if  < ^ (nos;n), and decreasing in  in the
opposite case.
Proof. Suppose  < ^ . Then, by lemma 1, h(nos;) < (n   1)=n and s
os > 1=n
in equilibrium. Let partial derivatives of g be denoted by subscripts, where g is
dened in (30). By the implicit function theorem, @sos=@ =  g=gsos. In the
proof of proposition 1 it has been shown that gsos > 0. Next, we will determine the
sign of g. It can be shown that g is decreasing in sos, then if g(1=n)  0, and
given that s
os > 1=n, we can deduce that g(s












os ((n   1)nos   n(nos   1))
< 1:
Rearranging terms, this expression is equivalent to h(nos;) < (n   1)=n which
holds by assumption. Thus g(s
os)  0 and @sos
@  0. The proof for  > ^  is
analogous, but reversing the inequalities.
Lemma 3. There exists d 2 (0; ^ ) such that sos is increasing in  for  < d, and
decreasing in  for  > d.
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, @sos=@ =  g=gsos, where g is dened
in (30). We know gsos > 0. With respect to g:
g = ln(nos)  
nos   1
 + (1   sos   )nos
Therefore, @sos=@ = 0 when g = 0. Solving for the value ^ sos that makes g = 0
we get:
^ sos =
ln(nos)(nos(1   ) + ) + 1   nos
nos ln(nos)
Introducing this in g = 0 we get an equation determining the value d that makes
the derivative equal to zero.
To prove that to the right of d the graph of sos() is decreasing, assume this is
not the case, so g > 0. Then, for  > d it has to be the case that sos > ^ sos, but
this implies that g < 0, which is a contradiction. This means that @sos=@ < 0
for  > d. A similar reasoning implies that @sos=@ > 0 for  < d.
Proposition 2. A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium for the two-stage game exists and
is unique.
Proof. For nos = 1 to be an equilibrium we only need f(2)  0. Likewise, for
nos = n to be an equilibrium we only need f(n)  0. In order to have an equilibrium
with both kinds of rms (1 < nos < n), we need that f(nos)  0 and f(nos+1)  0 at
the equilibrium nos. If f(2)  0 and f(n)  0 then it is guaranteed that there is at42 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE
least one such equilibrium. Therefore, existence of an equilibrium with 1  nos  n
is guaranteed. Simulations show that the equilibrium is unique for any value of the
parameters.
Proposition 3. Given n > 3 and , there exist 0 <   < ^  < 1, such that in
equilibrium:
i. If  > ^ , both kinds of rms co-exist and P have higher quality and market
share than OS.
ii. If   <   ^ , all rms decide to be OS, but a P rm would have higher
quality and market share.
iii. If    , all rms decide to be OS, and a P rm would have lower quality
and market share.
Proof. Simulations show that f(2) > 0 for any  and . This means that the
equilibrium always has at least 2 rms participating in OS. Lemma 5 will prove
very important in characterizing the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game.
In order for an OS rm to nd it protable to become P (f(nos) < 0), it has to
be the case that the increase in market share from becoming P is large enough to
compensate for the increase in cost. If  < ^ (nos 1;n), then OS rms have a larger
market share so it is not protable for them to deviate (f(nos) > 0). Corollaries 1
and 2 are two important implications of this lemma.
Lemma 5 (Sucient condition for positive f). If  < ^ (nos 1;n) then f(nos) > 0.






(1   (1   sos))  
~ sp
1   ~ sp





where sos = sos(nos) and ~ sp = sp(nos   1). The value of  does not inuence the
sign of f. The rst two terms have the same functional form and are increasing
in s. The last term is always positive. Therefore, if sos(nos)  sp(nos 1), then
f(nos) > 0. A sucient condition is that sos(nos 1)  1=n and sos(nos)  1=n,
which is equivalent to  < ^ (nos 1;n) and  < ^ (nos;n). However, ^ (nos;n) is
decreasing in nos, so  < ^ (nos 1;n) implies f(nos) > 0.
Corollary 1 (Necessary condition for an interior equilibrium). At an interior equi-
librium nos it is necessary that   ^ (nos;n).
Proof. For an interior equilibrium at nos we need that f(nos)  0 and f(nos+1)  0,
but Proposition 5 implies that for f(nos+1)  0 we need   ^ (nos 1;n).
Corollary 2 (Sucient condition for an equilibrium with nos = n). If   ^ (n  
1;n) then all rms decide to be OS in equilibrium.
Proof. If   ^ (n   1;n) then f(n)  0, so if nos = n then no rm would gain by
becoming a P rm.
Corollary 1 states that in any interior equilibrium it has to be the case that the
P rms have a larger market share than OS rms, and therefore a higher quality
product. Corollary 2, on the other hand, shows that if the degree of public good of
the investment is low enough, OS rms have a larger market share for any nos, and
therefore all rms decide to collaborate in the OS project. Lemma 6 complements
Corollary 2, by providing the necessary and sucient condition for an equilibrium
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Lemma 6 (Necessary and Sucient condition for equilibrium with nos = n). Given
n > 3 and , there exists   2 (^ ;1) such that f(n)  0 if and only if    .
Proof.  only aects the scale of f(nos), so assume  = 1 for the rest of this proof.
We know that f(n) > 0 for  < ^ (n 1;n). We need to determine the sign of f(n)









1   ~ sp
(1   (1   ~ sp));
where ~ sp = sp(n   1). We need to nd the value of ~ sp that makes f(n) = 0. There
are two roots of this equation. The only positive root is:
~ sp =
 n2(1   )   (1   )   n +
p
n4   2n2 z + z2
2 n(n   1)
where z =  (n   1)(n   1 + ). The corresponding value for sos(n   1) is:
~ sos =
n2 + s  
p
n4   2n2 z + z2
2 n(n   1)2
Plugging this value in the equilibrium condition (30) and solving for  we get the
value   where f(n) = 0. Lemma 5 implies that    ^ (n   1;n). Lemma 3 implies
that @~ sp=@ > 0 in the relevant area. This means that   is the unique value of 
such that f(n) = 0.
To nish the proof we need to show that f(n) > 0 for  <   and f(n) < 0 for
 >  . Given the continuity and monotonicity of sp, it suces to show there is
some value to the right or to the left of   such that these inequalities hold.
Consider rst the case of  <  . We know that at  = ^ (n   1;n), f(n) > 0.
This proves that f(n) > 0 for  <  . For  >  , consider  = 1. When  = 1, the
investment of OS rms is very low, and P rms have the largest advantage. In this
case, f(n) < 0, which proves that this inequality holds for any  >  .
Proposition 3 follows from a straightforward application of Corollaries 1 and 2
and Lemma 6.
Lemma 4. sos > sp in a second-stage equilibrium if










and sp > sos in the opposite case.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps than the proof of Lemma 1, but rearranging
the resulting condition in a dierent way.
Proposition 4. The optimal subsidy is  = , which attains the rst best levels
of investment. In equilibrium, all rms decide to be OS.
Proof. Assume that the subsidy is high enough, so that all rms decide to be OS.
Individual investments are xos = (+)(1 )=(ncos). Assuming that the subsidy
is nanced with lump-sum or proportional taxes is equivalent for this model. The
social welfare function is the same as before (taxes and subsidy cancel in the social
welfare function). The government wants to nd the subsidy which attains the
optimal investment x = ( + )=cn. Thus, the optimal subsidy becomes  = .
To nish the proof, we have to show that given this subsidy, all rms eectively
choose to be OS. Remember that if  > 1  
 
1   n(n   2)(n   1) 2
(n   1)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then sos > sp for nos = n   1, and therefore all rms want to be OS. Given that
n(n   2)(n   1) 2 2 [0;1],  > 1   (1   )(n   1) is a sucient condition, which
holds if  = .
Proposition 5. A second-stage equilibrium for the nested model exists and is
unique. Given nos, the equilibrium market shares solve (15) and (7).
Proof. The rst order conditions are (21) (22). As in the standard logit model, there
are no corner solutions so the rst order conditions hold with equality. Equilibrium
prices and investment for P rms are identical to the logit model so we will focus
on the OS rms. In the case of OS rms the partial derivative of the market share






si(1    sijos   (1 )si):
Then from the equation (21) and imposing symmetry we get the optimal price in


















From equation (22) and imposing symmetry we get equation (14), and the ratio of














































where  = aos +  bos   ap    bp represents quality dierences. From the
denitions of a and b:






From equations (34), (36) and (37), we get equation (15), which is an implicit
equation determining the relation of market shares between OS and P rms in
equilibrium. This equation, together with the equation establishing that the sum
of the market shares is equal to 1, completely characterizes the equilibrium.
Finally, to show existence and uniqueness, we need to prove two things: (1) there
is only one xed point of the system of equations in Proposition 5 (there is only one
symmetric equilibrium), and (2) the prot function is concave at the equilibrium
(the second order conditions for optimality hold).
To show (1), dene g(sos) by plugging (7) in equation (15). Then, the result
follows from an application of the mean value theorem as in the standard logit
model.
To prove that the prot function is concave at the equilibrium candidate, we will
evaluate the determinant of the Hessian of the prot function at the equilibriumOPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY FIRMS 45
price and market share, and show that it is positive denite. The determinant of










1      (1   )nos sos







1      (1   )nos sos




The determinant of the Hessian for P rms is equivalent to that of the standard
logit model. A sucient condition for both determinants to be positive is (1 ) 
 + , which has been assumed for this section of the paper. Thus, the concavity
of the prot function at the equilibrium is guaranteed for both kinds of rms.
Proposition 6. A symmetric equilibrium for the full compatibility case exists and
is unique. Equilibrium market shares solve (17) to (20). In equilibrium, sp  sos
and Sos  Sp, and the prot of the P rm is always higher than the prot of an OS
rm.
Proof. To show existence, we begin by noticing that for any value of Sos 2 [0;1],
there is a value of sos 2 (0;1=nos) that solves equation 17. This is because the left
hand side is continuous for sos 2 (0;1=nos), and goes from  1 when sos ! 0 to
1 when sos ! 1=n. By a similar argument, for any value of sos 2 (0;1=nos] there
is a value of Sos 2 [0;1] that solves equation 18. This implies that an equilibrium
exists.
To show uniqueness, let us denote equation (17) by f(sos;Sos) = 0 and equation
(18) by g(sos;Sos) = 0. By the implicit function theorem we can write Sos =
f1(sos) using the rst equation, and Sos = g1(sos) using the second equation. It
is straightforward to show that both functions are continuously increasing, but the
slope of f1 is always less than 1, while the slope of g1 is always larger than 1. This
means that the two curves cross only once, so the symmetric equilibrium is unique.






































Dene m as the right hand side of the previous equality. sp = sos is not an equilib-
rium because m < 0 when sp = sos. For equation (38) to return to the equilibrium,
sp has to increase and sos has to decrease relative to sp = sos. Therefore, the
equilibrium has sp > sos.
Next, we show that Sos > Sp. We will prove this by contradiction. By a similar













This implies that we should have sos 
+2
2(1+e2=)nos in equilibrium. If we intro-
duce sos =
+2
2(1+e2=)nos in the equilibrium condition (17), and rearrange terms,46 LLANES AND DE ELEJALDE


































Let ^ m be the right hand side of the previous expression. It can be shown that ^ m < 0
for any value of the parameters. Therefore, sos >
+2
2(1+e2=)nos in equilibrium,
and therefore, Sos  Sp cannot hold.
Finally, to see that the P rm will always have a higher prot than an OS rm,
notice that the P rm can always choose the same investment and price than an
OS rm. The P rm will have the same revenues due to the complementary good,
and the same cost of R&D, but it will also have some revenue on the primary good
side.